Phenomenological subjectivity and consciousness – groundwork for an eco-phenomenology

Subjetividade e consciência fenomenológicas – bases para uma ecofenomenologia

Rafael Zanlorenzi[1] , Mario Sergio Michaliszyn[1]

ABSTRACT

The present research aim to analyze the foundations of Husserl's phenomenology and its legacy, employing its attributes in the creation of an eco-phenomenology toolset. The trend in question focuses on the notable revision of the subject-object relationship, introduced by Husserlian thought. From his repositioning of the reflective subject under the *transcendental ego*, Husserl authorizes the reconstitution of the cognitive and epistemological bases of thought on a set of entitative qualities, which equates the aware observer to the observed entitative universe, according to the similarity of existential conditions. Thus, the reflective character that sediments human experience is henceforth considered a natural phenomenon, contiguous to other transformations and determinations of meaning conferred by non-human beings—biotic and abiotic, demanding a re-conception of their phenomenological roles as semiotic agents (and, therefore, agents of environmental transformation). The perspective changes translated here provide us with an opportunity to approach and refine the proposal for an assembly (parliament) of non-humans presented in Latour's work, thereby insinuating that the establishment of an ecocentric paradigm will only be possible under such philosophical conditions. Based on the massive version of this paradigm, the purpose is to review the scientific and political fundamentals for organizing the political scenario in favor of so-called ecological democracies.

Keywords: ecocentrism; eco-phenomenology; ecosphere; phenomenology; semiotics.

RESUMO

A presente pesquisa teve como objetivo analisar os fundamentos da Fenomenologia de Husserl e seu legado, empregando seus atributos na constituição de um conjunto de ferramentas de Ecofenomenologia. A tendência em questão está concentrada na notável revisão da relação sujeito-objeto apresentada pelo pensamento husserliano. De seu reposicionamento do sujeito reflexivo desde o *ego transcendental*, Husserl autoriza a reconstituição das bases cognitivas e epistemológicas do pensamento sobre qualidades entitativas, o que equipara a condição de ser pensante ao universo de entes observados segundo um assemelhamento de condições existenciais. Assim, o caráter reflexivo que sedimenta a experiência humana passa a ser considerado como fenômeno natural contíguo às demais transformações e determinações de sentido conferidos por entes não humanos – bióticos e abióticos, exigindo uma revisão de seus papéis fenomenológicos enquanto agentes semióticos (e, portanto, agentes de transformação ambiental). O giro perspectivo aqui organizado compõe uma oportunidade de aproximação e refino da proposta de assembleia (parlamento) de não humanos apresentada na obra de Latour, e insinua com isso que o estabelecimento de um paradigma ecocêntrico só será possível com base em tais condições filosóficas. Baseado na versão maciça desse paradigma, pretende-se a revisão das bases científicas e políticas de organização do cenário político em favor das chamadas democracias ecológicas.

Palavras-chave: ecocentrismo; ecofenomenologia; ecosfera; fenomenologia; semiótica.

[1]Positivo University – Curitiba (PR), Brazil.

Corresponding author: Rafael Zanlorenzi – Positivo University – Rua Pedro Viriatto Parigot de Sousa, 5300 – Cidade Industrial – CEP: 81280-330 – Curitiba (PR), Brazil. E-mail: rafael.zanlorenzi@hotmail.com

Introduction

Contemporary ecological thought is based on a collection of dilemmas that can often be reduced to the problem of the relationship between the human species and its capacity for accommodation/transformation/environmental dominance. These trends inject the problem of conservative anthropocentrism with an ethical turn, which would require revising models of thought towards an ecocentric tradition, as is the case of Arne Naess's Deep Ecology. However, the reflections pertinent to this movement—as well as other related ones, such as eco-anarchism—depart from the assumption that the debate in question can only be represented by discussions of an ethical nature (or of an entitative sense).

This important consideration, highlighted by the most recent studies of applied semiotics—notably employed in the ecology and biology fields—reiterates the need for a re-conception of knowledge production paradigms. The ethos (meaning) can be considered an emerging phenomenon at any point in the ecosphere—understood here as a set of mutual influences between biological and ecological factors in the planetary environment. This means that the ethos encompasses all sorts of emerging meanings, whether derived from conscious decisions, instinctive actions, or even from contingencies generated in the dynamics of varied abiotic phenomena. Semiotics transports these many possibilities to the context of agency—the ability to process/interpret information and, based on autonomous conditions, introduce changes to the environment (Sharov and Tønnessen, 2021). This definition of agency initially excludes abiotic events, embedded in the semiotic relationship as data sources to be interpreted. Hence, it is understood that an ecocentric vision is possible if it is specifically aimed at entities capable of processing/interpreting information and producing a transformative response to the environment, a vision that coincides, to a certain extent, with the proposal of an assembly of non-humans, presented throughout Latour's work.

With the novelty of a possible transformation conducted by non-human agents, it is necessary to understand that all of these agents interfere with each other—at least to some extent—and that therefore, they are responsible for each other. This view, which we call the soft perspective of the ecocentric turn, establishes an ethical concern about human action and requires at least consideration of the impact of human activity on other species and on the environment that all transforming agents occupy. This interpretation of the ecocentric turn has already been consolidated by deep ecologists' political musings and by recent ecosophical discourse.

We raise, however, a second hypothesis. If we consider the immediate products of phenomenological reflection regarding the role of consciousness in the world of life, then we will be compelled to also consider transformations of an abiotic nature within a second conception of agency. Now, from the perspective of a pure conception of change, the meaning of transformative decisions has little difference concerning abiotic changes in the environment. The only distinguish-

ing circumstance between one network of phenomena and another is the adoption of distinct meanings for purposeful and contingent changes. It can then be said that there is no difference between conscious actions, instinctive actions (of non-human species), growth and passive alteration of states (under the regime of chemical reactions of plants, for example), and contingencies (changes generated by alteration of conditions of balance and continuity also influenced by abiotic factors). We call this model of the ecocentric turn the hard perspective, and it is our purpose to demonstrate that an ecocentric turn is only fully processed when this perspective stage is reached.

In terms of these perspectives, phenomenological thinking already anticipates itself by bringing, through eco-phenomenology, a potential complement to the soft model. This complement is based on the repositioning of the subject, which abandons the limitations of an observer to assume the role of an intervening agent within the environment.

A hard perspective of ecocentrism starts with this very same assumption and therefore authorizes us to think of ecological relations as the byproduct of many forces that generate meaning. Thus, intentionality is also reduced to a natural phenomenon, and the distance between the cultural and the natural, the social and the pre-social, disappears. This is the hypothesis we intend to demonstrate. To this end, we begin with the review of phenomenological thinking as the means to engineer our conceptual bases and its relations with the architecture of science, technology and society (STS) studies by Bruno Latour.

The ecosophical possibilities of the works by Husserl and Heidegger

when Husserl proposes the bases of his philosophy, he supports his considerations on the abstractive faculty of the human being. This faculty is so accentuated that, in fact, it authorizes consciousness to emancipate itself from all experience; it demonstrates the existence of a transcendental quality of the subject, and only because of this ability can an observer understand its role in the composition of the phenomenon without falling victim to the elements that frame subject and object, and which therefore guide the path to unfold the phenomenon itself (Husserl, 1966).

Husserl's transcendental stance could be considered limited to a certain anthropocentrism, as it still focuses on the differentiation between the (analyzing) subject and the (analyzed) object. Heidegger, in turn, abdicates the use of these terms and prefers to understand the particularities of conscious humanity as elements characterizing its manifestations of being. However, if we evaluate the two authors more carefully, we will realize that Heidegger's vision, despite being promising, may represent more risks than Husserl's.

Heidegger presents two peculiar concessions to humanity's analytical capabilities, especially in *Being and Time*. First, it states that the potential for human abstraction represents a possible distancing of an individual in what pertains to a given experienced situation. This re-

treating attitude allows the individual to comprehend events with lessened interference from external sources.

Secondly, it appeals to the formative core of the ethos as a product of this consciousness, since it brings humans to the understanding of their irrefutable end, and therefore compels them to constitute through their actions a meaningful existence. This is what Heidegger calls "living for death", which he understands to be the generative force of existential meaning.

This shows that, in both cases, the conditions outlined by Heidegger deal with the distinctive attribute of the human condition—the fact that it can meditate on its own nature and existence and that, due to its anguish, it will constantly return to that same reflective passion.

Hence, our notion is that Heidegger's answer is attractive but in certain aspects, it can lead toward an anthropocentric recoil. Ho ever, the question arises: is it possible, even in the face of this differential risk, for phenomenology and its existentialist counterpart to reach the place of entitative leveling necessary for the foundation of an eco-phenomenology?

Let us return, for a minute, to the methodological discussion of *Being and Time* and the variables present in Heidegger's late writings. In the context of his work, the author focuses his effort on understanding the notion of *being*. There rests his privileged target of reflection, which immediately becomes inseparable from the fields of methodological access to which the philosopher intends to subject them. His conception of *Dasein* (being-there), the inaugural exposure of being to the world, is repositioned throughout his reflections as *Seiende*, or a continued and continuing "being-there", according to our translations. The expression intends to show the constant repetition of being under the most diverse conditions of manifestation to which it is exposed (Heidegger, 1996).

This is the thing that serves us and the phenomenological model of ecological reflection as well. After all, if there is no difference between this supposed thinking subject and the things he finds himself in front of, it is because everything is part of the arrangement of beings given in the world.

But if we evade one trap, we are on the verge of falling into another. This is because immanent reflection does not allow for subjective aspects capable of escaping the conditions of reality. Nothing escapes the world according to the Heideggerian *Dasein*. This also means that one can no longer count on an independent reflection of the circumstances that frame, limit, and induce an individual's capacities for understanding. It is no surprise that this same reading ends up being emphasized in the works of Gadamer—Heidegger's successor. Gadamer seeks to assimilate the composition of different perspectives throughout the experience as an affirmative product of each observer's particularities. To this end, it provides extensive detail regarding Schiller's work, clarifying the role of experiences in the realization of an eminently linguistic object.

Thus, if Heidegger's thought carries within itself the possibility of reformulating the phenomenon, it is only with Gadamer that its purest expression will be reached. Gadamer's Hermeneutics reconstitutes the phenomenon doubly: it denounces all contact with existence as mediated by varied languages, and for this reason, it rearticulates the subject-object tangency under a new structure: subject-object-subject. Through his work, it is easier to understand the semiotic expansions that may arise on the topic. The link of their experiential reflection is always established from possible representations of the target of human understanding. This dialogue therefore turns the comprehensive relationship into a communicational (aesthetic and linguistic) relationship (Gadamer, 1990). Thus, it submits itself to a logic of signs, and for this reason, it shows that the clash of experiences also contains a clash of manifestations, which are converted into modes of linguistic friction.

Semiotics, in this sense, knows how to use phenomenological traits to endow ecological reflections with strength. An example of this is in the contemporary ecosemiotic thought of Timo Maran (2020), which focuses on questions of meaning regarding natural states, non-human behaviors, and ecosystem signs as mechanisms for understanding human experience as belonging to the ecosphere.

But suppose we can find these ecocentric alternatives within phenomenological heritage; in this case, it is only because Husserl's phenomenology laid the foundations for an eco-phenomenology even before its dissident movements allowed the reconciliation between subject and object under the conception of being. Husserl's thought does not lose sight of the notion that the subject remains the agent of all understanding, even if the universal context of understanding is only considered within the scope of a natural phenomenon. But while positioning himself as a particular and (supposedly) sole agent of understanding, he also manages to clarify that his comprehensive inclinations arise as consequences of many states of affairs pertaining to the world and experience alike. This game of intertwining behaviors and limitations will be the cause of a necessary separation between the transcendental ego, which cultivates this reflective closure, and the empirical self, which surrenders itself to experience and, with this, accepts its inscription in time and space, even concerning its ability to meditate on reality and consciousness.

Thus, to escape comprehensive limitations means to visit individuals' positions in their temporal and material completeness: past, present, and future. This difficulty can only be overcome when observers are able to abstract their thoughts while abstracting themselves from the situations experienced. Therefore, they jump to a stage where the very form from which they will promote the meaning of their states of understanding must escape the limits of a pre-established language.

This affects communicational organization in itself, emptying it of its original meaning. In fact, it relativizes all the significant density of signs in communicational relations, while removing from them this intention to communicate, launching them into the individual struggle

to translate certain anxieties of contemplation of the world into minimally ordered propositions (a challenging task due to its existential nature). Contemporary Semiotics translates this dilemma through the formation of two concomitant axes of meaning. One of them encompasses the set of references dedicated to the organization of transcendental and phenomenal schemes of understanding; the other fulfills the task of building chains of signs for communication and expression of language within the universe of experience. While the first axis is exploratory and uncertain regarding bonds of meaning (it uses words to accommodate instances of being), the second reaffirms its objectivity by producing meanings connected to each other by a terminological circularity. It is one thing, for example, to seek to unveil the ontological meaning sheltered in the term "death"; another, very different, is to reduce the term to its medical definition or its legal convention (which will only determine the moment life ends for legal purposes).

In other words, what is in question is the appropriate way to align being and meaning. This occurs from an existential dimension, that is, from that axis of meaning that breaks away from traditional linguistic paths and seeks the precise translation of transcendental and phenomenal elements (understood by Heidegger as an essential and immanent tendency). The existential dimension reproduces the question, which can only be asked for the manifestation of being and which, therefore, exposes the discovery to communication acts, but only within the limits of what is possible (Tarasti's zemic system seeks to reproduce this relationship, showing the difficulties inherent to this intersemiotic trait) (Tarasti, 2015).

This perplexity represents the rupture feared by ecocentric views. The abyss that insinuates itself is the abyss of reflection that fails to communicate, although the agents disseminated throughout the ecosphere do not cease in themselves and are never interrupted. Perplexity is the conscious experience par excellence. But if the phenomenological mentality denounces the place of rupture, it also offers the possibility of restoration: perplexity is a necessary force for the conscious condition, and for this reason, it does not differ from the other manifestations present in the ecosphere.

Subjectivity in Husserl's work

the accommodation of the many shapes of agents under the sign of beings appears in Husserl's argument for repositioning the individual as an observer, present in his *Metaphysical Meditations*. Within it, Husserl seeks to demonstrate an in-depth understanding of successive stages of consciousness composition.

Regarding eco-phenomenology, it presents itself as an opportunity to confront the divorce between the individual and the environment. This abyss, however, only takes place as long as one remains in the field of naive reflection, as Husserl (1966) would call it, and to the extent that one can understand the complexity of the process of growing awareness, one discovers the set of tools for eradicating this very abyss.

From the very first steps of his work, Husserl exhibited great concern for the proper position of philosophical reflection. His initial explorations adopted a tone of greater severity regarding the distancing of philosophical conceptions and the structures and concepts of psychology (a movement that would be called psychologism, and which would limit philosophical clarifications to an understanding of the psychic tensions that motivate, constitute, and induce thought) (Husserl, 1966). The criticism that Husserl intends to establish represents the concern with the risks of environmental interference in the conception of adequate awareness of things. Just as space-time circumstances limit understanding, psychic resources can rush into the field of explanations, poisoning them and eliminating the possibility of approaching essential truths. This means that any faithful interpretation of reality and its objects depends on a review that transcends the traditional limits of philosophy, and therefore, demands a reconfiguration of the very formative bases of a theory of phenomena—bases located at the center of Descartes' thought.

In its Cartesian origins, the subject-object relationship is linked to the impossibility of a greater degree of confidence regarding the constitution of the object itself. Descartes begins with the assumption that the object only presents itself to the subject through data sets, which is why it remains, to some extent, alienated from the general reach of subjective consciousness. Its presumption therefore requires a series of steps internal to thought and derived from its *cogito* principle, as it would be called. The relationship established here is based on a founding characteristic of experience, namely, the thing that the knowing subject doubts (Descartes, 2008).

However, the Cartesian premise has limitations. Husserl anticipates the Cartesian movement and, in taking this step, distances himself from the modern model of subjectivity, delving deeper into the analysis of its inner aspects. Husserl demonstrates that the link between subject and object emerges from the contact between intuitive charges and evidence—details only accessible to minds dedicated to the most careful understanding of the subjective-objective interaction.

Husserlian thought states, therefore, that the condition of an object brings with it cognitive limits—it is hidden, at least partially. And if the object remains hidden to a certain extent, it is not due to the subject's complete distrust in relation to it and its connection to the sense data, as in Descartes. The limit appears because the subject, from its intentionality, gives meaning to the object. The problem revolves around what is not given by the object. If for Descartes the inaccessible is immediately discarded, or at least deemed external to the debate, for Husserl, this same inaccessible set of data requests from the subject the meaning of philosophical reflection and its phenomenal counterpart. This offers two distinct consequences for Husserl's thought: first, the subject constitutes the meaning of the object by assuming this "something more" that is not immediately displayed; second, there is more than one possible position for the formulation of evidence. This "some-

thing else" becomes, in Heidegger's thinking, the questioning of (or toward the) being.

Here, the founding question of the subject is established by Husserl. The connection between consciousness and the object exposed from the world grows from the possibility of establishing evidence, and the subject, in his concern for enlightening completeness, seeks the certainty that makes this evidence reliable and therefore makes it possible to repeat it later in many other circumstances. From this basis, it can be concluded that consciousness passes through the individual instead of belonging to him; it takes place as an independent phenomenon, although manifested in human individuality. It inaugurates the subject, but it is not its attribute. Notice, for example, how homogeneous existence—thrown into everyday life—seems to us, but how it is "awakened from itself" by exposing us to joys or sadness, pleasures or challenges. There lies this awakening of the subject, of the one who acts and understands, who strives to create something in the face of unusual circumstances or to enjoy what is exposed in its temporal and spatial rarity.

In this sense, evidence consists of any element given to cognition on which a reliable logical basis can be established. This means that the evidence carries a certain apodictic quality, as it presents such a degree of reliability that it can be used as the basis for broader and more complex elaborations (Husserl, 1966).

Here the divergence between both authors widens as Husserl himself insists. In Descartes, the most relevant evidence is the one established in the *cogito*. However, for Husserl, Descartes exaggerates his persistence, since he creates, from this singular apodictic observation, the entire extent of his thought when seeking to redeem through rational deduction the repeated concealment of the object and his reflection on the fallibility of perception (Descartes, 2008).

Husserl presents a central point of disagreement, and in doing so, exposes the greatest complexity of his subject. There is, in fact, a group of individuals that deals with the issues of the world in the literal manner they are presented and do so unreflectively: this group constitutes the lot of the Husserlian naïve. Individuals limit themselves to interacting with emerging objects without a deeper understanding of their phenomenal states. This is the person who drinks coffee while writing, who plows the land knowing its general conditions, maps the streets of a city while going to work, and so on.

The other group, beyond that one, gives itself in its own nature to the reflective activity. It no longer submits itself to these states and changes. It remains the same, inheriting its qualities and existential conditions from a dimension of the conscious individual that transcends it, and which, strictly speaking, translates its structural capacity to deal with the deeper question of the object's existence and its ways of existing. In other words, it is the transcendental ego, as we mentioned previously. Individuals in this group, who do not change according to the instances of materiality, grant objectivity due to their intuition of

things—the determining force for the general collection of evidence, which is then constituted into propositions.

Husserl understands that intuition establishes the founding link between subject and object by aligning the reflective conditions of that subject with the characteristics given by experience. In this sense, these two parts slide in contact with each other, and the adequate fit of both allows the formulation of evidence. It is important to highlight, however, that the emerging evidence can establish certainty in the case of a perfect fit, but it can also be insufficient—a situation in which it is clear to the subject that something still lies beyond the reach of cognition. This will give rise to more intense reflections regarding the very nature of the object and will represent a central stimulus for its reflective pursuit.

For now, it is essential to determine the dynamics that are specific to the subject as a knowing and conscious being. Unlike his intellectual heirs, who would place the dimension of human consciousness in an immanent sense and therefore belonging to nature, Husserl's transcendental commitment intends to separate the transcendental ego and, with this, also determine its capacity to recognize and think of itself as pertinent to the project of understanding the object. For Husserl, here lies the divergence between philosophical concern, which will only appear later in his meditations, and phenomenological reflection is established. While philosophy establishes its concern with the object's existence and the potential consequences of this specific "aspect of being" (i.e. the search for the object itself), phenomenology *per se* intends to understand the course of the formative ties of the phenomenon, that is, the subject-object interaction. For this reason, the transcendental subject—centerstage of the transcendental ego—launches itself towards understanding, intending to be included in it, considering itself an agent of cogitation. The transcendental condition authorizes this, and consequently, there is a way to elevate reflection beyond the point where it finds itself victimized by material transformations.

Still under the influence of Kantian thought, it is clear that Husserl persists in an explanatory division of the form of cognition. In this regard, the author seeks to demonstrate a distance between the exploration of essence and fact (analogous to Heidegger's manifestation). The observer contemplates the state of things, exposed to him as fact, in its innocent dimension. When you want, however, to promote the transition to transcendental conditions of thought, you ask about the essence. From it, he conceives the *eidos*, promoting this consideration in two stages: the first, adduced from principles of an *a priori* nature (such as the fact that all existing things have extension) has its origin in the transcendental qualities intuited from consciousness, while the intuition given to perception authorizes reflection on the *eidos* of the thing itself. The noematic (pressure of the object on perception) and noetic (leap to metaphysical reflection) stages of thought are, in fact, established on these two points. The *eidos* then becomes a meeting place, from which eidetic generalities (essential genus qualities) are applied to individuals, bringing from them eidetic needs (specific qualities of the

analyzed object) (Husserl, 2014). Thus, if, for example, I contemplate a pack of dogs, the qualities shared with other packs of dogs and packs of wolves are legacies of the eidetic generality, while the specific traits of that group appear as eidetic needs. Notice, however, that even if there is still some division between consciousness and reality, it can only be read tangentially to the problem. Reflection continues to suffer its primordial activation due to the object, and is dedicated, especially on the ontological plane, to the discovery of spheres that are never fully considered, to the point that Husserl declares without restrictions that the essence does not become a proper object of the observer's evaluation.

Ecophenomenology, subject and consciousness

it is the central intention of eco-phenomenology, in this sense, to question the conditions for the formulation of ontological thought, outlining a pertinent response to the set of complexities relating to ecosystemic and environmental debates without incurring losses, as it often occurs before the tensions inherent to the ecological discourse. Its final project aims to address a central dilemma of cognition, namely, the need to consider the transitional nature of objects.

An example of this is the research on the use of various by-products of the *Moringa oleifera*. This plant species has a diversity of uses, ranging from containing erosion processes through purposeful cultivation to nourishment and medicinal applications. But despite its benefits, the toxicity of its fruits remains a cause for concern, given the potential environmental impact on animal species that inhabit the same biome (Rubio et al., 2024).

The example demonstrates the necessary leap towards an ecosystemic shift. In this sense, both eco-phenomenological efforts and STS studies (fields of sociology and anthropology) can demonstrate the more rigorous meaning of a revolution of the object. In this case, the evaluation of the conditions of cultivation and treatment of the moringa tree requires economic, geographic, social, cultural, and ethological reflections, mixing species, biotic, abiotic, and human and non-human factors. This is the center of our reflection, and to delve further into the theme it will be necessary to face the contrast between phenomenological reflections and the proposals for SCS studies, represented here by Latour's thought.

Latour starts from an apparently negative view regarding phenomenological reflection (Latour, 1997). This is because it is understood that it still obeys the same conditions established by the modern paradigm, and therefore attributes to it a fierce dichotomy between nature and society (related to the rigorous and mistaken separation between subject and object). Indeed, there is a divorce at the center of ontological reflection but only due to the discursive demands imposed on the production of Husserl and his peers. When we analyze his internal references more carefully, we will be urged to consider less the seriousness with which Husserl treats the split between scientific, eidetic, and noetic models of thought, and more his understanding of the ontological

question. If phenomenology encourages this separation by establishing transcendental reflection and the transcendent recovery of the object, it is simply because it has already detected that, in ontological-existential terms, the traditional relationship with the object must be dismantled. Husserl clearly understands the overcoming of the modern model of thought, and it must be said that he does not subscribe to it. Still, he uses his language, realizing that his historical moment demands it, and that there is no possible revolution for the *Zeitgeist* without the proverbial preparation of the fields of intellectual reflection (much like Nietzsche's Zarathustra).

With this, Husserlian phenomenology seeks to establish dialogue tools for an indistinct and broader reality than what can be encompassed by modern thought, and in this sense, the conception of distinct stages of reflection is proposed. Thus, while the transcendental aspect establishes an intuition for consciousness, the logical aspect also authorizes, in thought, the game of particularizing ramifications of the *eidos*, establishing the reflection of declared ontological regions, which will be apprehended and reproduced by a set of propositional-representative conditions.

Latour starts from the assumption that a thought given to the rhizomatic qualities of the reality comprehension cannot be supported by phenomenological links, and this supposition seems inadequate. On the contrary, it is through the realization of ontological complexity that the need to specify the eidetic qualities brought into play by Husserl, described above, arises. With them, it is understood that the broader ontological identity is given from consciousness and by virtue of a relationship of particular unity between the observer and his own experience of thinking, and this relationship also presents the fundamental shock that generates the aforementioned separation. There is an identity that cannot be explained when you evaluate it from an external point of view, which creates an impression of separation. This was what Husserl meant, understanding that, strictly speaking, *phenomenological explanation never ceased to be immersed in ontology itself*, contrary to what Latour believes. Thus, the reflections of a potential eco-phenomenology are much more prepared to accept the complexities of a post-object mentality than Latour would assume.

In fact, the reflections of Latour's STS studies are more linked to Husserlian thought than his initial observations show. The construction of Latour's thought also intends to engender a new discursive formulation, which transcends the dichotomies derived from the organization of modern thought. Thus, in his *Politics of Nature* the author denounces the formation of a discursive perspective based on science (with a capital S, which differentiates it from scientific practice) that starts to configure a discourse of political entanglement, constantly put in dispute with open intellectual reflection, derived from social circumstances, consensus and exposure to the democratization of communication and comprehensive resources. Actually, this dissociation is not the only one to be encountered. Latour continues by stating that

the notion of a scientific discourse has as a tool the direct appropriation of practices of approximating and understanding nature. Silence then begins to be imposed based on these same techniques of elitization of the broad, socially established views of an environmental discourse (Latour, 2004).

It is important to understand that these same views question the relationship between political ecology and the formation of scientific discourse as opposing forces, at first. The relationship, however, ends up breaking down, since political ecology remains separated from the object for which it is supposedly launched. Latour presents the notion that political ecology does not include the defense of nature at its center. On the contrary, it is only from fragmentary reflections on environmental issues that this discourse is inscribed, and for this reason, it is not instructed for a relational context different from that in which the political tradition that precedes it is invested. Specifically, Latour seeks to revisit in his notions the same criticism that he establishes against the historical discourse in *Pandora's Hope* (Latour, 2000). His founding statement for political ecology is that it is suddenly inscribed in a space as if it represented a rupture, when strictly speaking, it only assumes a significant and representative tone that was already, to some extent, being explored. In fact, he states that there has never been a divorce between political philosophy and what is called nature, which is already enough for, at least in a general sense, to talk about an absence of innovation of meaning or resolution of problems through a political ecology.

These challenging reflections assume a departure from the separation between fact, discourse, and power, a relationship that would require a dilution of reflexive relationships and active capacities in sectors that would appropriate themselves of these stages. There, the modern mentality is established, with double asymmetry, according to Latour, as a narrative that breaks apart from the passage of time and creates a representation of winners and losers.

As a consequence, Latour's reflections, centered on the distinctions between the thoughts of Hobbes and Boyle, offer a layout of what he defines as the Constitution of the Moderns, in which a made-up nature rebels and becomes the defining impulse of the real, and a society not created by human hands begins to behave as if it were the creation of its own species. These relationships establish the basis for the separation between nature and society, but, according to Latour, they are not able to refute the possibility of mediations that intertwine and authorize translations between these two fields. There, he says, hybrid objects emerge, which throughout his work will assume new meanings, but will remain as bases for the intellectual production that reverses the notion of a God removed from His reality and incapable of articulating its extremes, but at the same time, posited as supreme judge, even in absence, of this divisive plot. This form of distancing from the creative force is also a refutation of the ontological dimensions, which Latour intends to recover in the review of his stages of thought.

Latour's propensity for overcoming discourses of an equivocal representative nature advances, in an exemplary way, the term "nature". His silencing exposition, given by the Constitution of the Moderns, requires a review of his position, carried out according to the effort of ontological purification, already promised by the author. Here, the cognitive rupture is reproduced for him in the process of a discursive renunciation, which disintegrates this lack of determination from the term nature as a silencing power and reestablishes his vision of ontology, opening the proposal to multiple visions (immanent and derived from eidetic regionalization) and, therefore, various natures. Thus, it demonstrates the unfeasibility of this false ontology, this mistaken exercise of a generalizing *eidos* in the context of their relationship. It recovers, strictly speaking, the traits of well-interpreted phenomenology, even though it refutes it (only in a nominal way, as can be seen) for considering it too much compared to its own sources.

Hence, hybridization and purification appear as movements parallel to the traits of an eco-phenomenology—itself dedicated to a rearticulation of significant powers for the more refined translation of ontological conditions specific to a scheme of organization of the real. It turns out that eco-phenomenology and Latour's STS thinking reach the same conclusion, that is, there is a profound crisis in the typical reading of the object. But while Latour focuses on the field of hybridization and network formation reflections, eco-phenomenologists intend to explore the duality between ontology and the network of possibilities, a problem not explicitly resolved by Latour but instructed by both lines of thought.

In fact, the resolution of the crisis in question occurs by bringing together the pieces that have already been outlined on both fronts. Eco-phenomenology intends to reaffirm the unity of things through the infinite continuity of their formative networks, while Latourian thought defines the issue according to the dilution of the object in the context of its immediate relationships. Uniting the two fronts, one can see the review of transcendental questions—now placed as the sum of all "possible possibilities" of the object networks involved (new model of generalizing *eidos*)—in opposition to Latour's regionalizing project (new vision of the eidetically necessary), which highlights the collapse of "possible possibilities" into the field of realized or immediately achievable possibilities. Here, the principle is established that determines, as force majeure, the bases for overcoming the soft model of the ecocentric turn towards a new one—the hard model.

Latour definitively contributes to the organization of this model by establishing, since hybridization, the inclusion of new acting forces, capable of producing meaning and composing the forces that generate meaning in the future environmental ensemble, represented in the thesis of the two parliaments. A parliament of non-humans then becomes a power of treatment that is not only received by translation mechanisms but rather determines the intersemiotic mechanisms and establishes the bases for the modeling of discourses.

On the other hand, the effects generated by ecosemiotic reflection add a fundamental component to this debate. When dealing with Symmetrical Anthropology as a method, the author advocates the notion that the catastrophic conditions in which we all find ourselves appear as a factor in establishing a symmetry that transcends local and historical distinctions. It places us all facing a loss of territoriality, identity, and future expectations, according to their conceptions (Latour, 2015). However, he ignores the regionalizing features of historical organization—a formation very different from the restrictive vision he criticized before when mentioning Pasteur's ferments and discoveries and the way how a certain discursive transversality of traditional history eternalizes impressions. In his interview with Carolina Miranda, there remains a crucial factor for understanding this formation of networks, namely, the inclusion of historical temporality (and not historicizing discourses) as the founding model of a properly ontological-purifying reflection. In this sense, the project of a Symmetrical Anthropology needs to be understood within a context given by forces of meaning and can be restored if it is also seen as a possible response to a specific dilemma, which in no way disregards the continuous asymmetry between distinct cultural and natural experiences (something that Latour seems to have intended to annul).

The ecosemiotic process remains a resource for reconciliation. This is not a statement of theoretical nature but rather the concentration of efforts according to the operational needs that arise in the face of disaster. Strictly speaking, the logic that runs through eco-phenomenologies, ecosemiotics, and Latourian thought is focused on one foundation: the resolution of missing incidents, the irreparability of communication failures, the abysmal fissure in which human beings find themselves as they are unable to reconcile the most specific portraits of their relationship with the active networks in the world.

Ecosemiotics intends to be the place for engaging these reflections and is far from being universal. On the contrary, it understands that the process of semiotic modeling—the strategy of organizing significant powers—is an active response that allows us to concentrate on the way of expressing a reality of two parliaments, or a world with non-human acting forces.

An example of this lies in the need to correct and review contemporary ecological discourses. Take the famous initiative of some hotel groups to promote their own honey production for their guests. The Waldorf Astoria, which gained notoriety for its practice, appears to create a discourse of environmental awareness (soft ecocentrism), when in reality it only attaches a kind of "designation of origin" to a product, using the initiative for its own advertising purposes. This relationship emerges when theoretical concerns continue to establish formal criticisms of modes of action, instead of considering that the final inversion of the Constitution of the Moderns must come through the ontological purification of methodological architectures and strategies. In this case, the previously mentioned asymmetry must consider that the Waldorf Astoria scenario can find the threshold of its "possible possibilities" in the marketing aspect of its initiatives—a trait that also belongs to the genuine content of a metropolitan historicity, a consumerist society and a capitalist model of brands and names.

Conclusion

Latour mentions the possibility of learning from those who have been historically dispossessed as if all circumstances were the same. However, material solutions are irreproducible; the arid lands of the moringa tree are not the hotel terraces of the bred and tutored beehives. Nevertheless, a strategy that demonstrates the effort of networks and signs can serve as an instrument for deeper reflection, as long as it does not capture, in a false postmodern counterattack, a kind of purely aesthetic emancipation, as Latour's proposal turns up to become.

In this sense, the act of emancipation itself must come from within the networks of meaning themselves. They can offer a complete victory because they can serve as ontological reinforcement from their threshold. This happens because the ontology of significant powers is negative in its deepest meaning. It is the refusal of one's own ontological content, and so it is the exaltation of all possible ontological trajectories. It reinforces the notion that every essence is always universal, and that is why it can only be inquired about from within the network. For this network to gain strength and be consummated, it must also be linked to the deepest and most visible possibilities of temporality and historicity, forces that are equally irrefutable when it comes to hybrid models of formation of an almost post-objectual reality.

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